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Abstract 
This paper highlights major reliability concerns in the trend of 
building smartness in everything from devices to systems. It 
alerts engineers to determine the trade-off equilibrium of new 
smartness in a more practical and realistic manner. The 
discussion is based on several common roles of smart 
practices that include software; driver; and redundancy. The 
major concerns are expressed in five areas: series reliability 
shrinkage; cold standby’s intrinsic imperfection; crossroad & 
roundabout jeopardy; software unreliability and cyber 
vulnerability.  
1 Introduction 
Nowadays smartness is a hot topic in technology. It is stirring 
up a new era in human history. We have everything being 
smart nowadays. Smart communication, smart home, smart 
building, smart modular technology, smart e-bike, smart grid, 
smart load …. , and last but not least, smart city. Engineers 
believe that the equipment, plant or system is smarter because 
there is more built-in or networking intelligence to look after 
operating parts and parameters. Smartness improves 
performance, but improved performance may not imply 
improved reliability. An intelligent man is an analogy. He 
often performs better than an average person; yet his 
performance does not upgrade his longevity. Very often, the 
enrichment of life commitments makes him more vulnerable 
to risks and flops. The chance of his life failure rate cannot be 
improved by his raw intelligence, unless such intelligence 
also makes him lower the “wear and tear” and “stress 
intolerance” which effectively lengthen the MTTF. Despite 
the concept of self-healing is now a part of smartness input to 
system, seldom will users challenge whether sacrifice of other 
reliabilities has been worthwhile.  
2 Smart Role Model 
Figure 1 depicts the five roles of smart technology in a plant 
performance, with a further understanding that in the modern 
world, this plant performance is not stand alone, but links to 
other plants or systems through internet connections. In this 
paper, plant is used as a generic term that covers load, process 
and system. 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Smart Role Model 
3 Series Reliability Shrinkage 
A driver is a series component in any process. It is the first 
serial step in an operation. Smart driver for a plant is no 
exception. In order to be reliable, both the driver and the “as 
was” plant process must be reliable. The mathematical 
expression have been well developed by  
 
 
Figure 2. Series Reliability 
With 2 components only in series, the combined reliability is 
given by: 
Rfinal = Rsmart x Rplant     (1) 
Hence a smart driver always lowers reliability unless it is a 
replacement for a less reliable driver. Even when it is an 
additional driver for smooth start and capability enhancement, 
still it will reduce reliability accordingly regardless the quality 
of performance it is elevating. The application of power 
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electronics drives in the late century and computer drives are 
examples in smart technology that enhanced capability, yet 
the effect on reliability was often overlooked. 
Similarly once smart technology is introduced to process a 
plant in series operational steps, similar reliability shrinkage 
will be experienced. A smart processor is a general term 
which describes that smart devices have been connected or 
built-into a plant. When this processor is empowered to be 
used as a gate for every cycle operation, then its reliability 
will also affect the combined reliability of the plant in every 
cycle.  
Nonetheless there are occasions that a smart processor may, at 
the same time, improve reliability in other aspects. Three 
aspects can produce this result: namely, processor injecting 
immunity power to the plant; processor operating standby 
redundancy; and processor replacing less reliable hardware 
control. The optimality of the second aspect relating to 
standby will be discussed further in the next section of 
cold-standby. 
4 Cold Standby Intrinsic Imperfection 
Standby redundancy provides back-up to an operational node. 
When the main component of the node fails, the back-up 
component can resume or maintain the node operation. Hence 
the node will fail only if both the main component and its 
back-up fail concurrently. With failure + reliability = 1, the 
combined reliability is given by: 
 
 
Figure 3. Redundancy Reliability 
Ffinal = Fmain x Fback-up   (2) 
Rfinal = 1  -  Ffinal    (3) 
= 1 – (Fmain x Fback-up) 
=1 – (1- Rmain) x (1 - Rback-up) (4) 
There are three types of standby redundancy: cold standby; 
warm standby and hot standby.  Whilst warm and hot 
standby provides ‘uninterruptible” or “seamless’ transfer 
between the main and standby, yet the cost of wear and tear in 
the standby may be substantial. That effect is somehow 
beyond the consideration of this paper. 
Smart technology enables powerful sensor and actuation in 
cold standby. At first sight, the smartness provides 
redundancy and hence enhances reliability. Yet this paper 
now explains that the enhancement can never be fully 
acquired. 
 
 
Figure 4. Cold Standby Sensor & Switch 
The sensor detects failure of the main; and command the 
switch to connect the backup for operation. Agarwal and 
Sahani [2] assumed stochastic behaviour of cold-standby and 
proposed difference-differential equations to calculate 
mean-time-to-failure, with assumption reliabilities being 
exponential time distributions. By using equations (1) and (4), 
The figure 4 shows a simpler model to understand the 
imperfection and limitation of cold-standby. The sensor and 
the switch are in series with the back-up component. Hence 
the reliability of the back-up is not by the component alone, 
but takes sensor and switch into account. The combined 
reliability of the whole operational node is redundancy 
reliability between the white box and the grey boxes. 
Rback-up combined  = Rsensor x Rswitch x Rbackup  (5) 
Rfinal = 1–(1-Rmain)x(1-Rback-up combined)  (6) 
There is another constraint in standby arrangement. It is 
called a “short circuit failure” where the main fails in such a 
way that it “permanently” short-circuits the operational node 
between the points A and B. As a result, the back-up cannot 
be connected to serve redundancy. Mathematically this part of 
main unreliability cannot be supported by the back-up. 
In a smart grid, where many power grids and micro-grids are 
interconnected, the provision of self-healing is common. 
Despite the model deliberated does not fully demonstrate the 
reliability effect because of the mesh restructure and 
possibility of reverse-flow during self-healing, yet the 
philosophy is similar to aforementioned. The use of PWM to 
monitor and to understand and to predict the characteristics of 
“energy” flow is common. The traditional fault analysis may 
not be sufficient to understand the ever-expanding complex 
circumstances that interlinks many major grids and 
micro-grids. 
5 Crossroad and Roundabout Jeopardy 
Smart technology is able to enlarge features. The smart phone 
serves a good example. There are upgrades every month. But 
undeniably most upgrades utilize the same screen and pad. An 
appropriate analogy of the scenario is new traffic roads added 
to junction existing roads, and each time the junction permits 
one road only to utilize it. Whilst the personal computer 
sector did provide a multi-tasking breakthrough when 
Microsoft window was replacing the old DOS command, yet 
the window is still handicapped in having the machine-human 
interface working for all tasks and features at the same time. 
The Figure 5(a) shows how the multiple features utilize the 
same path. By analogy of crossroad traffic, it is perceived that 
the ineffectiveness of feature B in the junction may: i) trim 
down traffic of feature A; or ii) temporary shutdown 
performance feature A; or iii) halt operation of feature A fully 
until a reboot of the plant. 
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Figure 5(a). Two Features in Same Path 
 
Figure 5(b). Two Features in Coupling 
The Figure 5(b) points out another scenario that two features 
not utilizing the same path may still produce interference. 
There is coupling effect. When the interference distorts 
performance to deviate from desirable norm, it is unreliability. 
Few processes are perfectly sealed against external 
disturbance as well as it output pollution to external. 
Processes in vicinity may not standalone and their emissions 
do propagate to neighbors in each other. The coupling effect 
is like a roundabout where traffic enters and exits has to cope 
with neighbors. 
6 Software Unreliability 
Humans have been paying attention to software unreliability 
for almost half a century [3][4]. Yet so far there is no “just the 
thing” model that can be applied to determine trustworthiness 
of software performance. Researchers like M. R. Lyu 
commented that software was invisible, and its invisible 
nature made it both beneficial and harmful [4]. I. Eusgeld et 
al. presented a good digest of software reliability model [5], 
yet considered Black Box Reliability Analysis based on 
failure observations from testing or operation was still a 
major class of assessment. Unlike hardware reliability 
assessment which could be done by measuring metrics, 
software reliability appraisal could not define metrics that 
could be measured. Often the software risk is concealed, and 
only at occurrence of turmoil may an engineer and a manager 
be aware of its existence. But then it has been too late.   
Smartness improves performance of many plants and systems 
by replacing operating parts from hardware to software; and 
by substituting control parts from hardware to software. The 
control is a bigger issue to be addressed. A substantial portion 
of traffic accidents was caused by failure of software in 
human brains rather than hardware embedded in the car 
machine.  
Software defects are designed faults [5], and they are 
“unnatural”. I. Eusgeld et al. suggested embracing both 
development and implementation into such design 
contemplation. As defects are inherent [4] and unknown, test 
and commissioning based on existing knowledge-base may 
not be able to detect their jeopardy. 
Despite the concern on software reliability, yet it becomes a 
universal truth and a global commitment to implement more 
software into new servicing plants and man-machine 
interfaces. The introduction of smartness from head to toes is 
an inevitable trend. Smart load, smart phone, smart meter, 
smart home, smart building, smart grid, and smart city, etc. 
fill our daily lives.  
No plant or system is smart unless it is software driven or 
processed. No one is certain whether safety is perfect in his 
system. A classic example of software uncertainty was the 
“millennium bug”. It was a global hot concern about 15 years 
ago. Notwithstanding human beings, computers and airplanes 
safely transited to a new century, yet even one second before 
the clock, no one could be perfectly certain on the scenarios 
of the next second. There had been much software built to 
guard against the bug, but the battle was difficult. The 
engineers were aware of that they were not fighting against an 
external enemy, but a bug intrinsic in the old software. If the 
enemy was external, they could build a shield to obstruct the 
disturbance. That time the enemy was invisible and its DNA 
was unknown. An extensive effort was made on mitigation of 
hazard, instead of developing a vaccine to immune the 
computer. The smooth transition at millennium is still a myth. 
We were pleased that the bug after all might not always be 
harmful, but the experience alerted us that software bugs were 
design faults and concealed. 
Of course, software may also improve reliability. 1. As 
aforementioned, when software may form a protective shield 
against disturbance and attack, then the chance of hardware 
failure will be lowered. 2. When the software is to immune or 
to medicate a plant, then the plant life will become healthier. 
Where software of other nature is going to be implemented, 
these two points should also be used as a counter-check on 
whether the new software would produce the opposite and 
negative effects. Software attacks are common nowadays. A 
single virus may paralyze one whole system. 
7 Cyber Vulnerability 
Open system [4] and open protocol have become norm of new 
smart systems. Notwithstanding software becomes embedded 
dependable in its systems, software and minds are now shared 
and networked. This is an inevitable trend as the benefits of 
this norm are plenty regardless its scope is beyond the 
discussion of this paper. 
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Figure 6 
Smart drivers of plants can be viewed as their master minds. 
Since they are so smart, and therefore human beings attempt 
to link master minds of plants to form a cluster of master 
minds; and to connect the many clusters into a system, and 
eventually an internet universe.  There are hierarchies that 
exhibit structure of feudalism and some others exhibit 
structure of the united nation. Regardless which structure and 
to which degree of resemblance, there are two characteristics, 
some master minds are empowered to be more superior than 
others; and reliabilities of plants are linked and possibly 
dependable to each other. There are master minds which drive 
systems instead of their corresponding plants alone. Many 
master minds nowadays are allowed to drive more than one 
system, with their executive arms reaching scores of systems 
simultaneously. Despite rules of priority are organized, 
clashes and conflicts are not uncommon. These systems are 
either homogenous (e.g. power grids) or non-homogenous 
(computer apps). Most of the master minds nowadays are 
bilateral directional. But when nerves of the master mind 
being paralyzed in any system, it is probable nowadays that 
the other systems will also be halted unless isolation of the 
faulty system and override/changeover are quickly responsive. 
For this reason, nations are highly alert about terrorist attacks 
on networks and grids. One blast may setback the whole 
world. 
The cost of preventing cyber attack by SCADA is as huge as 
USD7.25 B as reported by Jeff St. John [6]. There have been 
researches in extensive manner going alongside with the 
smart grid development. Adam Hahn et al proposed 
frameworks to evaluate the exposure of cyber attack risk [7], 
Shan Liu et al worked on vulnerability with particular 
attention to switching attacks [8]. There have been works in 
the University of Hong Kong on providing solutions so that 
smart grids and smart cities are increasingly invulnerable. It 
will continue to be a hot research issue for some years, and 
collaboration for it will also be “networked” for concerted 
effort. 
8 Conclusions 
The trend of smartness is inevitable, and standalone smartness 
will be overwhelmed by network smartness. It is envisaged 
that smartness enhances performance, but may not always 
enhance reliability at the same time. Reliability is a separate 
yet important issue to be jointly considered. This paper 
identifies five major areas of reliability concerns in modern 
smartness, namely, series shrinkage; cold standby nature; 
crossroad jeopardy; software reliability and cyber 
vulnerability. A program to enhance reliability is 
recommended in each smart system design so that smartness 
initiation will not amplify failure. Lacking reliability 
improvement is a threat in modern society which is 
demanding higher degree of smartness incessantly. In view of 
it, the paper advocates for concerted effort among all nations 
for future works on the smart network reliability.  
References 
[1] U. D. Kumar et al (2000): ‘Reliability, Maintenance & 
Logistic Support, a lifecycle approach’. Kluwer 
Academic Publishers. Chapters 3 and 4. 
[2] S.C. Agarwal1, Mamta Sahani & Shikha Bansal (2010): 
‘Reliability Characteristic of Cold-standby Redundant 
System’ in IJRRAS 3 (2) May 2010 pp. 193-199. 
[3] Jiantao Pan (1999): ‘Software Reliability’, Dependable 
Embedded Systems, Carnegie Mellon University, 
Spring 1999, 18-849b 
[4] Michael R. Lyu (2007): ‘Software Reliability 
Engineering: A Roadmap’, Proceeding FOSE ’07 
Future of Software Engineering, 2007, IEEE Computer 
Society, pp. 153-170.  
[5] I. Eusgeld, F.C. Freiling, and R. Reussner (Eds.) (2008): 
‘Software Reliability”, Dependability Metrics, LNCS 
4909, pp. 104–125, Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 
2008 
[6] Jeff St. John: April 17, 2013: Report: US Smart Grid 
Cybersecurity, 
http://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/report-u.s
.-smart-grid-cybersecurity-spending-to-reach-7.25b-by-
2020 
[7] Adam Hahn & M.animaran Govindarasu (2011) “Cyber 
Attack Exposure Evaluation Framework for Smart 
Grid.” IEEE transaction on Smart Grid, Vol 2, No. 4, 
2011 
[8] Shan Liu, Salman Mashayekh, Deepa Kundur, Takis 
Zourntos and Karen L. Butler-Purr (2012): A Smart 
Grid Vulnerability Analysis Framework for 
Coordinated Variable Structure Switching Attacks Proc. 
IEEE Power & Energy Society General Meeting, San 
Diego, California, 2012 
Smart 
Master 
Mind 
Cluster 
A 
Cluster 
B 
Cluster 
C 
Cluster 
D 
Cluster 
E 
Cluster 
F 
384 
